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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROLAND WEBB,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a Utah
corporation, WILLIAM REAGAN,
individually, and WILLIAM
ADAMS, ESQ., individually,
and DOUGLAS T. HALL, ESQ.,
individually,

No. 890164-CA
Category 14(b)

Defendants-Appellants
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989).

This appeal has been poured over

to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to an order from the Utah
Supreme Court.

This appeal is taken from the final order entered

by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, the
Honorable James Sawaya presiding, granting summary judgment and
dismissing the fourth cause of action of defendant R.O.A. General,
Inc.fs counterclaim.

The court's order of January 5, 1989 has been

certified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in failing to hold that Utah

Code Ann. §78-12-27 was the applicable statute of limitation?
2.

Did the trial court err in determining that the

plaintiff-respondent had not waived his right to rely on the
applicable statute of limitations?
3.

Did the trial court err in determining that genuine

issues of material fact did not exist as to the adequacy of the
disclosure allegedly made by plaintiff-respondent before taking
advantage of a corporate opportunity?
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27, U.R.C.P. 9(h) and 56 are
determinative.

The text of each provision is set forth in the

Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-respondent, Roland Webb, at all pertinent times,
until July, 1981, served as a director and president of Galaxy
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. ("Galaxy Advertising").
1022 at p. 24)

(R. 559, 828,

In February, 1977, the board of directors of Galaxy

Advertising consisted of five individuals, including Webb.

(Id.)

Prior to February, 1977, Galaxy Advertising entered into
negotiations to sell its Wyoming division to one of its employees,
Eldon Palmer.

(R. 560, 1023 at p. 8) Webb handled all of the

negotiations with Eldon Palmer on behalf of Galaxy Advertising.
(R. 1022 at p. 25)

During the negotiations for the sale of the

Wyoming division, unknown to the Galaxy Advertising's board of

directors, Eldon Palmer offered to give Webb an option to acquire
51% of Palmer Outdoor Advertising, Inc. in exchange for certain
considerations.

(Id. at pp. 27, 60)

On or about February 10,

1987, Galaxy Advertising's board of directors approved the sale of
the Wyoming division to Palmer Outdoor Advertising, Inc.

(R. 560)

Following the sale of the Wyoming division of Galaxy
Advertising, Webb obtained a 51% equity interest in Palmer Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. for only nominal consideration.
20-22, 69-72)

(Id. at pp. 20-22, 70-72)

(R. 1022 at pp.

Although Webb maintains

that he made a full and adequate disclosure of his pending interest
in Palmer Outdoor Advertising, Inc., substantial evidence was
presented to the trial court that Webb never disclosed to the board
of directors of Galaxy Advertising that he had an option to
purchase a majority interest in Palmer Outdoor Advertising prior to
Galaxy's sale of its Wyoming division.

(icL at pp. 62, 73, 75; R.

1023 at pp. 32-35)
Approximately three years after purchasing a majority
interest in Palmer Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Webb sold his
interest in the company for $3,050,000.

(R. 1022 at p. 72)

On or about July 7, 1981, defendant-appellant R.O.A.
acquired Galaxy Outdoor Advertising.

(R. 689-90)

On or about May 28, 1987, Roland Webb brought the instant
action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
asserting several causes of action against defendants.
33-78)

(R. 2-20,

Defendant-appellant R.O.A. thereafter filed a counterclaim

seeking to recover damages for Webb's alleged breach of a fiduciary
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duty while a director of Galaxy Advertising.

The fourth cause of

action of R.O.A. agajnst Webb asserted that Webb had improperly
usurped a corporate opportunity from Galaxy Advertising when he
obtained his interest in Palmer Outdoor Advertising.

(R. 202-72)

Webb failed to raise the limitation period in Utah Code Ann.
§78-12-27 as an affirmative defense in his answer to defendant's
counterclaim.

(R. 292-99)

Webb later moved for partial summary judgment on the
claim of usurpation of a corporate opportunity on two grounds:

(1)

that the claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitation,
and (2) that he had made adequate disclosure to the board of
directors of Galaxy Advertising prior to taking advantage of the
corporation opportunity.

(R. 580-88)

Defendant-appellant R.O.A.

resisted Webb's motion claiming that he had waived any right to
rely on the applicable statute of limitations, and that genuine
issues of material fact existed as to the adequacy of the
disclosure allegedly made by Webb.

(R. 828-37)

Oral argument on Webb's motion for partial summary
judgment occurred on August 1, 1988. The Honorable James S.
Sawaya, District Judge, issued a minute entry on August 30, 1988,
finding that the facts under which the defendants' fourth cause of
action arose existed and were known by R.O.A.fs predecessor in
1977, and that, as a result, the claim for usurpation of corporate
opportunity was barred by the applicable statute of limitation.
(R. 838)

On or about September

19, 1988, R.O.A. moved the trial

court pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

to certify the court's order granting Webb's motion for partial
summary judgment as a final appealable order.

(R. 841-42)

On or

about January 5, 1989, the trial court entered its order of partial
summary judgment, dismissing R.O.A.'s cause of action for
usurpation of a corporate opportunity, and certifying the same as a
final order pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(R. 870-71)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in failing to find the applicable
statute of limitation on R.O.A.'s counterclaim for Webb's
usurpation of corporate opportunity was Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27.
The trial court further erred in failing to find that Webb had
waived his right to rely on the statute limitation defense due to
Webb's failure to affirmatively assert the defense in his answer to
R.O.A.'s counterclaim.

Furthermore, the trial court committed

error in failing to find that genuine issues of material fact
existed as to the nature and adequacy of Webb's disclosure to the
board of directors of Galaxy Advertising.

The existence of such

genuine issues of material fact should have precluded the trial
court from entering partial summary judgment in favor of Webb on
R.O.A.'s counterclaim for usurpation of the corporate opportunity.

-R-

ARGUMENT
POINT I,
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-27 APPLIES TO R.O.A.'S
COUNTERCLAIM FOR USURPATION OF A CORPORATE
OPPORTUNITY.
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27 provides the applicable statute
of limitation for actions brought against corporate stockholders
or directors:
Actions against directors or stockholers of
corporations to recover a penalty or
forfeiture imposed, or to enforce a
liability created, by law must be brought
within three years after the discovery, by
the aggrieved party, of the facts upon which
the penalty or forfeiture attached, or the
liability accrued, and in case of actions
against stockholders of a bank pursuant to
levy of assessment to collect their
statutory liability, such actions must be
brought within three years after the levy of
the assessment.
The "liability" referred to under Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27 is that
liability arising out of the mere fact of being a corporate
director or stockholder.

American Theatre Co. v. Glasmann, 95

Utah 303, 80 P.2d 922 (1938).
In the instant appeal, it is undisputed that Roland Webb
was a director and officer of Galaxy Advertising at the time of
the sale of its Wyoming division to Eldon Palmer.

Before the

trial court, Webb contended that R.O.A.'s failure to refer to him
as a "officer", rather than as a "director", of Galaxy
Advertising, rendered Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27 inapplicable.
However, it is interesting to note that Webb himself claimed in
his initial memorandum in support of his motion that Utah Code
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Ann. §78-12-27 was the applicable limitation period.

(R. 585-87)

Webb's position that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27 applies only to
suits against individuals specifically referred to as corporate
"directors or shareholders" is untenable.
The Utah Supreme Court in Grosgean v. Ross, 572 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1977), analyzed the nature of the liability imposed under
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27.

In Grosgean, the plaintiff brought an

action to recover for the value of services rendered to the
defendants and for fraud.

The trial court dismissed the action,

finding the action time barred by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27.

The

Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's actions on the
ground that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27 did not apply because the
case did not arise out of the defendants' relationship to the
corporation as directors or stockholders:
The courts have rather uniformly held under
statutes such as this that the sections
refer to such liabilities as arise from or
grow out of the fact of being a director or
stockholder, a liability founded upon the
fact of, or imposed because of, the
relationship of being a stockholder or
director.
Id. at 1384 (quoting American Theatre Co. v. Glassman, 95 Utah
303, 80 P.2d 922 (1938) ) .
R.O.A.'s apparent technical omission to specifically
refer to Webb as a corporate "director" in its counterclaim should
not influence this Court's ruling as to the applicable statute of
limitation.

It is well established that the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure were intended to do away with such technical pleading
requirements.

See Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d

966 (Utah 1981) (the fundamental purpose of the liberalized
pleading rules is to afford parties the privilege of presenting
whatever legitimate contentions they have, subject only to the
requirement that their adversary be given fair notice of the
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication
of the type of litigation involved).

See also, U.R.C.P. 8(f).

Under the liberalized pleading requirements of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, Webb is not entitled to rely upon the
fact that he was not specifically named as a corporate "director"
in R.O.A.'s counterclaim.

While there are technical legal

distinctions between being a corporate "officer" and a corporate
"director", the terms for purposes of pleading should be
considered to be nearly synonymous.

This is especially true in

the instant case, where Webb was both an officer and a director of
Galaxy Advertising.

Webb testified in his own deposition as

follows:
Q. Okay.
Galaxy?

What was your position with

A.

I was the president.

Q.

Were you on their board of directors?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What was your position on the board?

A.

What was my position on the board?

Q. Yes.
A.

I was president.

(R. 1022 at p. 12)
R.O.A.'s counterclaim clearly gave plaintiff adequate

notice of the nature, basis and grounds of R.O.A.'s claims against
him.

Even a casual reading of R.O.A.'s counterclaim reveals that

R.O.A. intended to seek recovery for plaintiff for breach of a
fiduciary duty by improperly taking advantage of a corporate
opportunity.

While R.O.A.'s counterclaim could have perhaps been

more artfully and technically drafted, the averments found in that
counterclaim clearly fall within the scope of Utah Code Ann.
§78-12-27.

Furthermore, it stands to reason that the

applicability of the statute of limitation for corporate director
liability should depend more on the relationshp out of which the
action arises rather than the terminology used by the parties in
their pleadings.

As a result, this court should find that the

applicable statute of limitation to R.O.A.'s fourth cause of
action is Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27.
POINT II.
WEBB HAS WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO RELY ON THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATION SET FORTH IN UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED §78-12-27 (1953).
It is fundamental under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure that a party intending to rely on the protections of a
statute of limitation must specifically plead the statute upon
which he is relying.

U.R.C.P. 9(h) provides:

In pleading the statute of limitations it is
not necessary to state the facts showing the
defense but it may be alleged generally that
the cause of action is barred by the
provisions of the statute relied on,
referring to or describing such statutes
specifically and definitively by section
number, subsection designation, if any, or
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otherwise designating the provision relied
upon sufficiently clearly to identify it.
If such allegation is controverted, the
party pleading the statute must establish,
on the trial, the facts showing that the
cause of action is so barred. (Emphasis
added).
Public policy favors the right of action, rather than the
right of limitations.
(1970).

Slade v. Slade, 81 N.M. 462, 468 P.2d 627

As a result, this Court should construe the law and facts

in a light most favorable to the party seeking to enforce its
right of action, rather than in favor of the party relying on a
statute of limitation.

Safeco Insurance Co. v. Honeywell, Inc.,

639 P.2d 996 (Alaska 1981).
The Utah Supreme Court has on numerous occasions held
that a party may be barred from relying on a statute of limitation
defense which has not been specifically pleaded.

In Wasatch

Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2d 70, 465 P.2d 1007 (1970), the
court was asked to consider the sufficiency of a defendant's
general plea of the statute of limitations.

The plaintiff brought

action to recover certain monies due from the defendant on the
purchase of soil removed from the plaintiff's property.

The

defendant pleaded a statute of limitations defense without
designating what sections of the statute or statutes upon which he
relied.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the

ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations.
In reversing and remanding the action back to the trial
court, the Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant's general
plea of the statute of limitations was not in accordance with

U.R.C.P. 9(h), As a result, the defendant's statute of
limitations defense was not considered pertinent on appeal.
Wasatch Mines, 465 P.2d at 1010-11.

See also, American Theatre

Co. v. Glasmann, 95 Utah 303, 80 P.2d 922 (1938) (the court held
that the defendant's failure to specifically plead the statute of
limitation for actions against corporate directors barred the
defendant's right to rely on the statute of limitation defense).
In the instant action, Webb raised the following second
affirmative defense to R.O.A.'s counterclaim:
34. Defendant's counterclaims are barred,
in whole or in part, by the applicable
statutes of limitations, including, but not
limited to, Utah Code Annotated §78-12-23,
25 and 26.
(R. 297)
Webb's failure to raise the limitation defense found in
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27 constitutes a waiver of that defense.
the trial court level, Webb defended himself against R.O.A.'s
counterclaim for more than a year without ever raising Utah Code
Ann. §78-12-27 as a defense.

To permit Webb at this late

juncture, following extensive litigation and discovery, to rely
upon this defense is unwarranted.
POINT III.
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REMAIN AS TO
WHETHER WEBB MADE A FULL AND COMPLETE
DISCLOSURE OF THE CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY.
Assuming arguendo that Webb has not waived his right to
rely on the defense afforded him under Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27,
or any other limitation period, genuine issues of material fact
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At

existed as to the nature of the disclosure allegedly made by Webb
to the corporate directors of Galaxy Advertising.

As a general

rule, statutes of limitations, including Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27,
do not begin to run until a party has notice of the wrongs
committed against him.

See, Jones Mining Co. v. Cardiff Mining &

Milling Co., 56 Utah 449, 191 P. 426, 429 (1920).

As previously

indicated, genuine issues of material fact exist with regards to
whether Webb made an adequate disclosure to Galaxy Advertising's
board of directors and when such a disclosure was actually made.
Due to the existence of such genuine issues of material fact, the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Webb.
The Utah Supreme Court in Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d
721, 731, n. 2 (Utah 1982), recognized that a corporate director
"who desires to acquire a corporate opportunity for his own
benefit should make full disclosure and submit any questions of
fact, such as the corporation's interest or financial or legal
ability, to the impartial judgment of others."

The determination

of whether an adequate disclosure has, in fact, been made and
whether the disclosure gave notice of the wrongs committed
involve critical questions of fact that must be resolved by the
trier of fact.

The Oregon Supreme Court in Klinicki v. Lundgren,

695 P.2d 906, 919-20 (Or. 1985), set forth the following standard
for determining whether an adequate disclosure of a corporate
opportunity has been made by a corporate director:
(1) The director or principal senior
executive must promptly offer the

opportunity and disclose all material facts
known regarding the opportunity to the
disinterested directors or, if there is no
disinterested director to the disinterested
shareholders. If the director or principal
senior executive learns of other material
facts after such disclosure, the director or
principal senior executive must disclose
these additional facts in a like manner
before personally taking the opportunity.
(2) The director or principal senior
executive may take advantage of the
corporate opportunity only after full
disclosure and only if the opportunity is
rejected by a majority of the disinterested
directors or, if there are no disinterested
directors, by a majority of the
disinterested shareholders
Full
disclosure to the appropriate corporate body
is, however, an absolute condition precedent
to the validity of any forthcoming rejection
as well as to the availability to the
director or principal senior executive of
the defense of fairness. . . . Where a
director or principal senior executive of a
closed corporation appropriates a corporate
opportunity without first fully disclosing
the opportunity and offering it to the
corporation, absent ratification, that
director or principal senior executive holds
the opportunity in trust for the
corporation.
In the instant case, genuine issues of fact exist as to
whether the disclosure allegedly made by Webb, was a full and
complete disclosure.

In his deposition, Webb admits that he did

not disclose to any one at Galaxy Advertising that he had an
option to purchase a majority interest in Palmer Outdoor
Advertising prior to the conclusion of the deal.
62, 73)

(R. 1022 at pp.

Webb also admits in his deposition that the facts which

he disclosed to the other directors may have constituted less than
a full disclosure:

-13-

Did you ever go to the Hatch or the Glassman
family and say, what I am doing is,
basically, selling this to myself?
A. That's not at all -- what you are saying
is not what's happened, because I'm not
selling it to myself. You are selling it to
Palmer. I was not involved in the
negotiation initially.
Q. All right. Did you tell anyone at
Galaxy or Orpheum that you had an option to
purchase this company, half of this company
that you were selling to Palmer?
A.

I did not.

Q. But all based upon the business
opportunity that you saw when Orpheum and
Galaxy wanted to sell the Wyoming operation
to Palmer and took and never advised your
employer of it; is that right?
A.

I did advise him.

Q.

Prior to the consummation of the deal?

A.

No, I didn't.

(R. 1022 at pp. 62, 73)

(See also R. 1022 at p. 20-25, 60-62,

70-75)
The fact that other directors of Galaxy Advertising were
not aware of Webb's purchase of an interest in Palmer Outdoor
Advertising is further demonstrated in the deposition of Mr.
George Hatch.
Advertising.

Mr. Hatch also served as a director of Galaxy
In his deposition, Mr.

Hatch noted that he did not

have full knowledge of Webb's interest in Palmer Outdoor
Advertising.

(R. 1023 at pp. 8, 10, 32-35)

Affidavits submitted

by defendants in opposition to Webb's motion for partial summary
judgment further demonstrate that Webb may not have made an
-14-

adequate disclosure of the corporate opportunity to the directors
of Galaxy Advertising.

(R. 607-11)

The record before this Court demonstrates that genuine
issues of material fact existed as to the nature of the alleged
disclosure made by Webb to the board of directors of Galaxy
Advertising.

The trial court erred in finding as a matter of law

that there was no conflict in the testimony as to when and how
Webb disclosed the corporate opportunity to Galaxy Advertising's
board of directors.

As a result, the trial court erred in

entering an order of partial summary judgment in favor of Webb,
dismissing R.O.A.'s counterclaim for usurpation of a corporate
opportunity.

U.R.C.P. 56.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, R.O.A. respectfully requests
that the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in
favor of Webb and dismissing R.O.A.'s fourth cause of action be
reversed and remanded to a trier of fact for a resolution of the
genuine issues of material fact.
Dated this /ft$

day of C/.^Ofjtf^

, 1989

ih]
Stephen J. Trayner
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant Reagan
DOUGLAS T. HALL
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
R.O.A.
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ADDENDUM
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-27
Actions against directors or stockholers of
corporations to recover a penalty or
forfeiture imposed, or to enforce a
liability created, by law must be brought
within three years after the discovery, by
the aggrieved party, of the facts upon which
the penalty or forfeiture attached, or the
liability accrued, and in case of actions
against stockholders of a bank pursuant to
levy of assessment to collect their
statutory liability, such actions must be
brought within three years after the levy of
the assessment.
RULE 9(h), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
In pleading the statute of limitations it is
not necessary to state the facts showing the
defense but it may be alleged generally that
the cause of action is barred by the
provisions of the statute relied on,
referring to or describing such statutes
specifically and definitively by section
number, subsection designation, if any, or
otherwise designating the provision relied
upon sufficiently clearly to identify it.
If such allegation is controverted, the
party pleading the statute must establish,
on the trial, the facts showing that the
cause of action is so barred. (Emphasis
added).
RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
*

*

*

(b) For defending party. A party against
whom a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.

-Al-

Motions and proceedings thereon. The
motion shall be served at least 10 days
before the time fixed for the hearing.
The adverse party prior to the day of
hearing may serve opposing affidavits.
The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may
be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue
as to the amount of damage.
*

*

*

Form of affidavit; further testimony;
defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall
be attached thereto or served therewith.
The court may permit affidavits to be
supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavit or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not
so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against
him.
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